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1 Abstract
This document is a white paper1 about how to connect reverse engineering
and programing skills to extract data from a proprietary implementation of
a database system to build EML-Tools[1] for data format conversion into raw
data.
This article shows how to access data of a source software system without any
interface for data conversion. We discuss how raw data can be transfered into
structural format by using XML or any other custom designed software solution.
For demonstration purposes only, we will use a CRM[2] system called HarmonyR©
by HarmonyR© Software AG2, the programing language Python and methods of
computer security, which are used to get quick access to the raw data.
2 Requirements
• Python, programing skills in Python3 and in network programing[3];
• Reverse Engineering skills[4];
• XML knowledge (optionally recommended)4[5];
• Wireshark5 and one trail copy of HarmonyR©.
∗This copyright protected article is for scientific purpose only. According to German law
this scientific document is not suposed to act or be abused against §202 StGB.
†Dipl.-Inform. Marc Burdon is a computer scientist, who graduated at the University of
Bonn (Germany).
‡Copyright c©2014 by Marc Burdon.
§This paper was written in December 2011, but refreshed and pubished now, in April 2014.
1This paper (Version September 1, 2018) does not give any scientific progress, but it shows
potentials of the chosen topics on higher scientific level.
2All trademarks are property of their owners, as HarmonyR© is of Harmony Software AG.
3Please refer to docs.python.org
4Please refer to www.w3.org
5Please refer to www.wireshark.org
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Figure 1: Figure (a) shows the regular data package streams between client
and server. During Man-in-the-middle attack (b) data packages will be copied
and stored as raw data (c). When data extraction is finished, the data is ready
to be migrated to another system e.g. a SQL database.
3 Theory
3.1 Method to Access Data
In the beginning, we realize that offline data extraction from files on the file
system of the database server will cost much more time than we will need us-
ing TCP/IP technology, because the reverse engineering process is much more
quicker in this case, which is using the TCP/IP client of HarmonyR© CRM soft-
ware solution. We have to know the structure of the HarmonyR© CRM software
system that we just name H. The relevant core of H consists of a TCP/IP
client and a TCP/IP server, which is the database server. We name HarmonyR©
Software client as Hc and Harmony
R© software database server as Hs. We define
a data package d = (b0, · · · , bn) with b0, · · · , bn, which are bytes coding a string
character. We also define the set of data packages D and a set of raw data
R. We also use a self made network package filter M(·, ·). M(·, ·) is actually
a function mapping data packages transfered by using TCP/IP from Hc and
Hs (and vice versa) to R, so formally M , M : D × D → R, is commutative.
We use M for a Man-in-the-middle attack[6] on H. Technically M is a hybrid
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TCP/IP of both client and server system, which is Hc is connected to and Hs
is connected by. The data connection between Hc and Hs is not encrypted by
default. It can be encrypted by using e.g. TLS/SSL technology – though the
funtionality is implemented by using SSH[7][8] –, but by default in local area
networks traffic is not supposed to be encrypted by manufacturer.
Figure 2: This is a screenshot of the Desktop of the machine that is hosting H
and M (09 tcp hyrouter.py). At his point the connections between Hc and M
as well as M and Hs are established. M is capturing all TCP/IP data packages,
which are sent from Hc to Hs.
SSH tunneling is activated for remote data exchange only. In fact, because
of missing encryption it is easy to interpose M and run a Man-in-the-middle
attack.
The client server protocol of H also misses handshake based authentification
procedure that uses cryptographic functions. It is only string based, meaning
to make M establish a connection to the server we just easily have to sniff – e.g.
using wireshark – the first data packages to get the string, which consists of user
name and password. The string can establish communication to the database
server without even logging into the system. The system looks up the user in
its user list and verifys the password to grant access.
3.2 Extraction of Raw Data
The reverse engineering process is easy since M is implemented and runs in-
terpoled between Hc and Hs. Once we are connected to the server via M , M
can log network transmission traffic, so client commands, which gets sent to
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Figure 3: Each transfered TCP/IP package has been captured by M and saved
to the hard disk (see right corner). The user name demo and the licence infor-
mation have been transfered in plain text and can be captured.
the server, can be identified. This process is very easy to handle, since on each
pressed button of the GUI of Hc the client sends the command containing data
packages over the established TCP/IP connection.
Obviously M can also be used as standalone client without being connected
by client, meaning formally M(∅, D′) with a generator function, which generates
fake packages from captured data, or M(Df , D′) with Df is the set of fake
data packages, which contains server and database control commands, and D′
consisting of data packages from Hs. To get a proper DF we have to reverse
engineer the full native protocol of H.
This can be done by using Hc on M to connect to Hs as described above.
To keep work time as low as possible, we skip reverse engineering of the
full proprietary protocol of H. Instead, we just take the most important client
commands that transfer data to the client to display it to the user. The traffic
contains the raw data, we are looking for. M will copy and save the raw data
on-the-fly.
3.3 Data Cleansing
Finally, the collected raw data R is full of non-data relevant symbols, so Data
Cleansing (dc) is required for proper data extraction. Therefore we have to iden-
tify the introduction and the termination bytes of the data. We have to define a
structure that will be build by the introduction and termination bytes, which R
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Simple Algorithm for Data Cleansing
Input: Set C of m known data bytes C = {c0, ..., cm−1}
Set of n raw data bytes R = {r0, ..., rn−1}
Output: Clean and structured data in bytes as a set SXML
init empty set SXML;
do SXML = buildstructure(R,C)
return: SXML
Figure 4: Assuming that we know the bytes, which introduce and terminate
data, we manage them in a set called C with C ⊂ R. We can use this algorithm
for data cleansing. Function buildstructure(·, ·) constructs the data structure by
setup filtering C and returning R\C in XML syntax as SXML.
contains. For our algorithm (see Figure 4) we define a function buildstructure(·, ·)
that builds the structure of the extracted data and removes given introduction
and termination bytes. The structure of the extracted data is usually based
on tree-like structures and/or SQL table schemes, when migrating data to SQL
database. On the other hand it is also possible to extract the data into the file
system, meaning to store the text data in text files and binary data like pictures
as binary image files. So the design of the structure depends on the application.
The implementation of M , which is based on the prototype 09 tcp hyrouter.py
will not extract data. 09 tcp hyrouter.py is suposed to capture network traffic
only to support reverse engineering process of the trasfer protocol of H in this
paper.
Corollary 3.1. Simple Algorithm for Data Cleansing needs O(n2) steps to ter-
minate.
Proof. We have two sets R and C with |C| < |R|, because of C ⊂ R, so initiation
is
|C| · |R| = m · n = O(n2).
Obviously structural analysis takes O(n2), because we have max. of m ·n steps.
Further more, constructing XML based tree structure from data takes O(n2),
because the function has to check input and refer to predefined actions regarding
to introduction and termination bytes, so the procedure is powered by n in the
length of the input, meaning O(n2). Simple Algorithm for Data Cleansing is
terminating, because C and R are not infinite. It runs correct, because all byte
coded string symbols are predefined and known to the algorithm. Finally, we
get
3 ·O(n2) = O(n2)
by definition.
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Figure 5: Each transfered TCP/IP package has been captured and stored to
local the hard disk drive. Data was transfered in plain text.
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4 Practice and Future Work
A demo version of M a.k.a. 09 tcp hyrouter.py written in C/C++ is about
TBA for scientific purposes.6 A detailed description of the transfer protocol of
H is available in the full report of How to extract data from proprietary software
database systems using TCP/IP. The full reverse engineered description of the
transfer protocol of H is TBA. Regarding demonstrative details, please refer to
Figure, 2, 3 and 5. For detailed information about this topic, please refer to the
full report of How to extract data from proprietary software database systems
using TCP/IP.7
M will be redesigned and implemented in C/C++ with additional features
like data cleansing function and compatibility to XML. It will automatically
convert the output in XML, so data migration to SQL will be possible. Addi-
tionally there will be a data extraction mode, which will optionally store the
raw or fully extracted data on the hard disk drive – meaning a data cleansing
procedure will be executed for full data extraction. The implemantation will be
available for WindowsR©, LinuxR©, MacOSXR© and NetBSD.
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